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Abstract—End-user privacy in mobile telephony systems is
nowadays of great interest because of the envisaged hyper-
connectivity and the potential of the unprecedented services (vir-
tual reality, machine-type communication, vehicle-to-everything,
IoT, etc.) being offered by the new 5G system. This paper
reviews the state of subscription privacy in 5G systems. As the
work on 5G Release 15 – the first full set of 5G standards –
has recently been completed, this seems to be an appropriate
occasion for such a review. The scope of the privacy study
undertaken is limited to the wireless part of the 5G system
which occurs between the service provider’s base station and the
subscriber’s mobile phone. Although 5G offers better privacy
guarantees than its predecessors, this work highlights that there
still remain significant issues which need rectifying. We undertook
an endeavor to (i) compile the privacy vulnerabilities that already
existed in the previous mobile telephony generations. Thereafter,
(ii) the privacy improvements offered by the recently finalized
5G standard were aggregated. Consequently, (iii) we were able
to highlight privacy issues from previous generations that remain
unresolved in 5G Release 15. For completeness, (iv) we also
explore new privacy attacks which surfaced after the publication
of the 5G standard. To address the identified privacy gaps, we
also present future research directions in the form of proposed
improvements.
Index Terms—5G, anonymity, GSM, LTE, mobile networks,
privacy, UMTS, unlinkability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile telephony subscribers’ personal information has
become an attractive target for online advertisements and
other connected industries. Besides the commercial arena, the
Edward Snowden revelations show that national intelligence
agencies also collect telephony subscribers’ personal informa-
tion on an unprecedented scale [1]. Apart from the danger
that this personal information is utilized for nefarious political
agendas, it may also be misused for personal advantages. Thus,
privacy has turned out to be a primary consideration for end
users when selecting and using a telephony service today.
From a regulatory compliance perspective, the EU General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [2] obligations for pro-
tecting personal data of subscribers are directly applicable
to mobile telephony operators. With penalties that can reach
as high as EUR 20 million or 4 percent of total worldwide
annual turnover, there is a huge financial risk for mobile
operators in the event of potential non-compliance. Hence,
protecting end-user privacy is all the more important for the
latest international mobile telephony standards such as 5G.
3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), the de facto in-
ternational body for mobile telephony standardization, released
the first documents pertaining to 5G at the end of the year
2017. The development of the 5G system was planned in
two phases: 5G Phase 1 (formally called Release 15) and
5G Phase 2 (formally Release 16). As 5G Release 15 –
the first full set of 5G standards – was frozen 1 in June
2019 (see Figure 1), this seems to be an appropriate time
to undertake a comprehensive review of one of the most
prominent privacy aspects of 5G based mobile telephony, i.e.,
subscription privacy on the wireless channel. 5G security and
privacy documentation [3] often refers to previous generations
for elaboration of various security and privacy requirements.
The same is true in the case of subscription privacy where
Release 15 refers to 3GPP TS 33.102 [4] for the requirements
which are listed below:
• User Identity Privacy: The permanent identity of a user
to whom a service is delivered cannot be eavesdropped
on the radio access link.
• User Location Privacy: The presence or the arrival
of a user in a certain area cannot be determined by
eavesdropping on the radio access link.
• User Untraceability: An intruder cannot deduce whether
different services are delivered to the same user by
eavesdropping on the radio access link.
An important point to note here is that the use of the phrase
“cannot be eavesdropped” in the above statements should
not be misinterpreted if it only refers to a passive adversary
'eavesdropping' on the radio interface. This certainly is not
the case here and a few previously published papers [5] fell
prey to this misnomer. 3GPP has always considered active
adversaries for its security and privacy scenarios. A pertinent
example of this is the 3GPP study TR 33.899 [6] which was
conducted to collect, analyze and further investigate potential
security threats and requirements for 5G systems and contains
explicit references to active adversaries.
In this paper, we provide an overview of the state of
subscription privacy on the 5G radio interface. Keeping the
aforementioned privacy objectives in mind, this paper eval-
uates, systematizes, and contextualizes the requisite aspects
of 5G subscription privacy in three chronological categories;
past, present and the future. The past category looks at
the state of subscription privacy before the advent of 5G
Release 15. In present, the improvements provisioned to user
privacy by Release 15 are explored. Finally, the future category
1After "freezing", no additional functionality can be added to a Release.
Fig. 1: 3GPP time-lines pertaining to various Releases.
discusses the privacy aspects which still could be improved in
subsequent Releases.
A. Scope of the Study
There are three aspects which play a pivotal role in defining
the scope of the study undertaken in this paper:
• We confine the privacy study undertaken in this paper
to the wireless part of the 5G system. This is primarily
because this medium is open and can easily be exploited
by any malicious party and, as a result, is the most
vulnerable.
• In this manuscript only those aspects of subscription
privacy are discussed which come under the purview
of 3GPP. Modern-day smart phones have evolved into
powerful devices with functionality that goes beyond just
telecommunications. These multitasking devices are now
being utilized for all sorts of computational purposes
which may or may not affect the end-user privacy that
3GPP is trying to protect. There are numerous other
sources of leakage affecting user privacy such as Wi-
Fi [7], Bluetooth [8], etc. which do not fall under the
purview of 3GPP. We do not consider privacy leakages
via these other sources in this work.
• Lastly, as work on 3GPP Release 16 (Phase 2 of 5G) is
still under active development, we do not consider the
ever-evolving Release 16.
B. Contributions
To our knowledge, this paper presents the first work on
5G subscription privacy after the completion of the first phase
(Release 15) of the standard. Unlike other survey papers whose
ambit of 5G security and privacy exploration has been very
wide, we focus on one particular and very critical aspect, i.e.,
subscription privacy on the 5G wireless interface. In summary,
the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Comprehensive Overview: This paper categorizes the
privacy from the viewpoint of mobile users. To do so in
a comprehensive manner, we study around 50 published
papers and 20 3GPP publications to sift and sort the
appropriate aspects of subscription privacy in 5G.
• Chronological Context: In this work, various aspects of
subscription privacy are contextualized in a chronological
order which gives an insight into the standards’ develop-
ment cycle and provides the reader with an opportunity
to appreciate how things evolve in the real world.
• Identification of Future Challenges: Based on our
study of the evolution of subscription privacy in 5G, we
highlight possible issues that are yet to be addressed and,
where appropriate, the impediments faced in resolving
such challenges.
C. Paper Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II provides the requisite background. Section III discusses
the privacy vulnerabilities that existed before 5G, while im-
provements to subscription privacy provisioned by 5G are
detailed in Section IV. In Section V, outstanding privacy issues
of 5G and future research directions are discussed. Section VI
describes the related work. Finally, Section VII concludes the
paper and provides recommendations.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
Before we delve further into the subscription privacy aspects
of 5G, we outline the mobile telephony ecosystem and its
pertinent security and privacy mechanisms
A. System Architecture
The mobile telephony architecture consists of three main
domains; Home Network (HN), Serving Network (SN) and
User Equipment (UE) (see Figure 2). The subscribers carry
UE, which typically refers to Mobile Equipment (ME) (the
phone) containing a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC)
(the SIM card). The HN domain represents the network
functions that are conducted at a permanent location regard-
less of the location of the subscriber. The HN is where a
subscription initially gets registered. It stores the subscribers’
credentials and is responsible for management of subscription
information. The SN domain is the part which provides the
subscribers access to the telephony network and its services.
It represents the network functions that are local to the user’s
access point and thus their location changes when the user
moves. The SN is responsible for routing calls and transport
of user data/information from source to destination. It has
the ability to interact with the HN to cater for user-specific
data/services.
Often UEs may have to operate in areas where their oper-
ators have no network coverage (i.e., base stations). In such
scenarios called roaming, other service providers, who have a
roaming agreement with the subscriber’s operator, provide SN
services. Hence, in this paper, we treat SN as a semi-trusted
entity to whom a subscriber’s long-term credentials can not
be exposed (barring a few exceptions). Note that according to
the 3GPP standard [3], HNs and SNs are further divided into
logical sub-entities. The security and privacy properties being
discussed in this paper do not require this level of granularity.
It is within the UICC that the application Universal Sub-
scriber Identity Module (USIM) runs. The USIM represents
the relationship between a subscriber and its issuing HN. Dur-
ing a subscription registration, the HN stores the subscriber’s
long-term identifier, Mobile Station International Subscriber
Directory Number (MSISDN) (the telephone number) and
other subscriber related data, including a 128-bit secret key K
and 48-bit monotonically increasing counters called Sequence
Numbers (SQNs), within the USIM. These SQNs are utilized
for the purpose of replay prevention. While an SQN should
be synchronized between the UE and HN, sometimes it may
become out-of-sync due to the loss of messages on the
wireless channel. We therefore use SQNUE and SQNHN
to refer to the state of SQN in UE and HN respectively.
These subscription parameters are also stored within the HN’s
database and form the basis of a security context between UEs
and HNs and by extension (during roaming) between UEs and
SNs. The SNs provision services to UEs after establishment
of a secure channel between them with help of the HNs.
(a) When not roaming, both HN and SN belong to the same mobile
network operator.
(b) When roaming, the SN and HN belong to distinct mobile network
operators.
Fig. 2: The mobile network architecture. The channel between
UE and SN is initially unprotected while that between SN and
HN is assumed to be protected.
B. Identifier Types and Terminologies
In mobile telephony systems, networks allocate to each
subscriber a unique long-term identifier, known up to 4G
as the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and
since 5G as the Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI). A
SUPI as defined in 3GPP TS 23.501 [9] is usually a string
of 15 decimal digits and acts as the long-term identifier of
an individual subscriber. The first three digits represent the
Mobile Country Code (MCC), while the next two or three form
the Mobile Network Code (MNC) that identifies the network
operator. The length of the MNC field is a national affair.
The remaining (nine or ten) digits are known as the Mobile
Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN) and represent the
individual user of that particular operator. Each decimal digit
of the SUPI is represented in binary by using the Telephony
Binary Coded Decimal (TBCD) encoding [10].
Authentication between a user and its service provider is
based on a shared symmetric key (details in Section II-E),
thus can only take place after an initial user identification.
However, if the IMSI/SUPI values are sent in plaintext over the
radio link for this purpose then subscribers can be identified,
located and tracked using these permanent identifiers. To
avoid this privacy breach, subscribers are assigned temporary
identifiers called Globally Unique Temporary User Equipment
Identity (GUTI) by the SNs. A GUTI uniquely and globally
identifies a particular subscriber. These frequently-changing
temporary identifiers are then used for identification purposes
over the wireless link before the establishment of a secure
channel. The International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI),
which uniquely identifies the ME, is a string of 15 digits.
If the IMEI is sent in plaintext over the radio interface
then it could compromise user privacy as it is also uniquely
identifying from a subscription viewpoint. However, the 3GPP
specifications prohibit a UE from transmitting the IMEI until
after establishment of a secure channel with the network [11].
C. Security Assumptions
1) Assumptions on Channels: According to 3GPP TS
33.501 (sub-clause 5.9.3) [3], the channel between SN and
HN should provide confidentiality, integrity, authentication and
replay prevention. The channel between UE and SN essentially
being a wireless one is subject to eavesdropping, interception
and injection of messages by malicious third parties.
2) Assumptions on Parties: The UE and its associated HN
are fully trusted entities. The shared secret data being stored by
these two entities is assumed to be protected from third parties.
Specifically, the UICC is considered to be a tamper-resistant
security module whose contents cannot be read by a malicious
entity. SNs are semi-trusted entities in the sense that during
the secure channel establishment the long-term shared secret
key K and sequence numbers SQN should not be revealed to
them while the SUPI is provisioned to them. The provisioning
of SUPI is essential for accurate billing purposes.
3) Assumptions on Cryptographic Functions: All the cryp-
tographic functions (detailed in Section II-E) are assumed to
provide both confidentiality and integrity protection to their
respective inputs.
D. Initialization of Authentication
As we will see in Section II-E, secure channel establishment
between subscribers and their service providers is conducted
via challenge-response protocols based upon the shared secret
key K. Thus, before such protocols can be executed it is
imperative that the service provider correctly identifies the
subscriber with whom this channel needs to be established.
3GPP TS 33.501 (sub-clause 6.1.2) [3] details the procedures
for this subscription identification and selection of the subse-
quent authentication method (see Figure 3).
The SN may initiate an authentication with the UE during
any procedure establishing a connection with the UE. The UE
sends the SN either the 5G-GUTI in a registration request
message or the Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) as a
response to an identifier request message. The SUCI is a ran-
domized public-key encryption of the SUPI (see Section IV-A
for details). In the case of a 5G-GUTI, the SN extracts the
corresponding SUPI from its database and forwards it along
with its global identity Serving Network Name (SNname)
to the HN in an authenticate request message. Otherwise
the SUCI is sent instead of the SUPI. Upon receipt of the
authenticate request message, the HN checks whether the SN
is entitled to use the serving network name in the request
message by comparing the incoming serving network name
with the expected serving network name. The HN stores the
received serving network name temporarily. If the SN is not
authorized to use the serving network name, the HN responds
with a serving network not authorized message. If the SUCI
is received in an authenticate request message by HN, it de-
conceals the SUPI from it and chooses the authentication
method based upon its policy.
E. The 5G-AKA
The security of communication between telephony sub-
scribers and their service providers requires mutual authentica-
tion and key agreement. In 5G systems, these requirements are
fulfilled by either EAP-AKA’ or 5G-AKA, both Authenticated
Key Agreement (AKA) protocols. EAP-AKA’ and 5G-AKA
are quite similar with identical message flows but with minor
differences in the way various keys get derived. We therefore
consider only 5G-AKA in this paper. 3GPP TS 33.501 (sub-
clause 6.1.3.2) [3] defines the details of the 5G-AKA protocol.
The security of 5G-AKA is based upon the shared symmetric
key K, while SQN provisions replay protection. To initiate
authentication, the UE sends the SN either the 5G-GUTI in
a registration request message or the SUCI in response to an
identifier request message (as explained in Section II-D).







MAC Message Authentication Code




HRES/HXRES Hash of RES/XRES
KAUSF Intermediate Key
KSEAF Anchor Key
Figure 4 shows the 5G-AKA and its associated failure
mechanisms. Table I details the various acronyms used in
Figure 4. In Figure 4, R is a uniformly chosen 128-bit random
number, functions f1,. . ., f5, f1∗ and f5∗ are symmetric key
algorithms. f1, f2 and f1∗ act as message authentication
functions, and f3, f4, f5 and f5∗ are used as key derivation
functions. Key derivation is performed using the Key Deriva-
tion Function (KDF) specified in 3GPP TS 33.220 [12]. A
successful 5G-AKA culminates in the derivation of the anchor
key KSEAF by both SN and UE, from which further keys
for subsequent communication are derived. The two cases of
authentication failure for the 5G-AKA are as follows:
1) MAC_Failure: As the first step in authentication con-
firmation, the UE checks whether the received MAC
value is correct or not. In case of a failure [Case ¬(i) in
Figure 4], the UE replies with a MAC_Failure message
back to the SN.
2) Sync_Failure: After MAC verification, the UE checks
the freshness of the sequence number SQNUE received
UE




(SUPI , K, SQNHN )
1. SUCI to SUPI de-concealment






SUCI or SUPI , SNname
(Authenticate Request message)
Fig. 3: Initiation of Authentication Procedure.
in the authentication challenge. In case of this fail-
ure [Case (i) and ¬(ii) Figure 4], it responds with
a Sync_Failure message along with a re-sync token
AUTS. Note that in Figure 4, the sequence number fresh-
ness check is denoted by XSQNHN > SQNUE − 4.
What this actually means is that there is some “window”
of size 4, within which sequence numbers smaller than
the current sequence number of UE will be accepted given
they previously had not been received by the UE. This
mechanism is there to handle out-of-order delivery of
challenge messages from HN to UE.
During the execution of 5G-AKA, it is crucial that SQN
is protected from an eavesdropper during the exchange of
messages between the UE and SN as its exposure may lead to
the compromise of the identity and location of a subscriber.
We will see in Section V-B how SQN leakage can manifest
into privacy vulnerabilities.
F. Lawful Interception
Note from Figure 4 that at the culmination of a successful
5G-AKA, the HN provides the SUPI of the UE to the SN.
This is required essentially for two main purposes; accurate
billing and Lawful Interception (LI) requirements. The law
enforcement agencies of almost all countries require that their
local service providers should have the capability to locate
and track any particular mobile user once required by law.
The SUPI is later also used as an input to the key derivation
functions between UE and SN. This ensures that the SUPI
value provisioned by the HN is the one claimed by the UE,
otherwise the communication breaks down.
G. Paging Messages
When a UE does not have any ongoing data transmissions, it
enters an idle state in order to preserve energy. If delivery of a
network service like a call or SMS needs to be delivered to the
UE, the network probes the idle UE by sending a “paging”
message and the UE responds correspondingly. The paging
procedure works because even when in the idle state, the UE
keeps on monitoring for the paging message at certain device-
specific time intervals. The device is able to preserve battery
because, at other times, it switches off its receiver. The idle
UE decodes these broadcast probes and if it detects its identity
in these messages, it randomly acquires an available radio
channel and asks the concerned base station for “connection
setup” for exchange of further signalling messages.
III. THE PAST - INHERITED CHALLENGES
The first and foremost task for 5G Release 15 was to address
the privacy vulnerabilities that existed in the previous genera-
tions. Hence, before we discuss the improvements offered by
Release 15, we take a look at the vulnerabilities that already
existed in the early generations that affect subscription privacy
on the radio channel. Table II provides a summary of the
attacks on subscription privacy in earlier generations.
A. IMSI-catching
As mentioned in Section II-B, for obvious privacy rea-
sons, GUTI is utilized for subscription identification purposes
over the wireless interface before the establishment of a
secure channel. However, there are certain situations where
authentication through the use of these temporary identifiers
is not possible. For example, when a user registers with a
network for the first time and is not yet assigned a temporary
identifier. Another case is when the network is unable to
resolve the IMSI from the presented GUTI. An active man-in-
the-middle adversary can intentionally simulate this scenario
to force an unsuspecting user to reveal its long-term identity.
These attacks are known as “IMSI-catching” attacks [18] and
persist in mobile networks, including LTE [14], [11]. IMSI-
catching attacks have threatened all generations of mobile
telephony for decades [19]. In IMSI-catching, through the
use of identifier request messages (Section II-D) the attacker
obtains the identities of everybody around in an attack area.
The attacker needs no previous assumption of who might be
there, and needs no previous information about the victim. It is
thus a powerful attack, which breaches the subscription privacy
UE









CONC ← SQNHN ⊕AK
AUTN ← CONC‖MAC
CK, IK ← f3(K,R), f4(K,R)
XRES ← f2(K,R)
XRES∗ ← KDF (CK‖IK, SNname‖R‖XRES)
HXRES∗ ← SHA256(R‖XRES∗)
KAUSF ← KDF (CK‖IK, SNname‖CONC)
KSEAF ← KDF (KAUSF , SNname)
SQNHN ← SQNHN + 1
XCONC‖XMAC ← AUTN
AK ← f5(K,R)
XSQNHN ← XCONC ⊕AK
MAC ← f1(K,XSQNHN‖R)
Check (i) XMAC ?=MAC




KSEAF ← KDF (KAUSF , SNname)
RES∗ ← KDF (CK‖IK, SNname‖R‖RES)
HRES∗ ← SHA256(R‖RES∗)
Check HRES∗ ?= HXRES∗
Check RES∗ ?= XRES∗
MAC∗ ← f1∗(K,SQNUE‖R)
AK∗ ← f5∗(K,R)








If (i) and (ii) then:
If ¬(i) then:
If (i) and ¬(ii) then:
Fig. 4: The 5G-AKA protocol and its associated failure mechanisms.
completely. IMSI-catching is well documented as a Key Issue
(Appendix A) in 3GPP TR 33.899 (sub-clause 5.7.3.2) [6].
B. (Raw) IMSI-probing
In its discussions, 3GPP distinguishes between “IMSI-
catching” and “IMSI-probing”. IMSI-probing is where an
attacker already knows the subscription identity, e.g., an IMSI
or an MSISDN plus some associated information, and wants to
find out whether the subscriber with this identity is present in
a given area. This is a far less powerful attack than IMSI-
catching. There are many possible ways to carry out such
an attack, e.g., send a bunch of (if possible silent [20])
SMSs or other “activity triggers” to that MSISDN and see
whether there is a corresponding flurry of signalling in the cell
you are testing. Preventing all sorts of IMSI-probing attacks
would be difficult and would involve a lot of overhead, e.g.,
dummy signalling to conceal when the real signalling happens.
Consequently, it was not thought worthwhile to address this
attack by 3GPP.
C. Unauthenticated IMEI Request
In GSM and UMTS systems, it was possible for an attacker
to request the subscriber for its IMEI via an unauthenticated
identity request message [13], [15], [17]. However, from LTE
onwards, such provisions were removed and now the network
can only request the user for its IMEI after establishment of
TABLE II: Summary of privacy attacks in the previous generations

























































IMSI-catching [11], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19] III-A
(Raw) IMSI-probing [20] III-B
Unauthenticated IMEI Request [13], [15], [17] III-C
GUTI Persistence [21], [22] III-D
GUTI-MSISDN Mapping [22], [23], [24], [25] III-E
C-RNTI based Tracking [26] III-F
GUTI Reallocation Replay Attack [21], [27] III-G
Localization through Measurement Reports [22], [28] ? III-H
IMSI-paging Attack [29], [22], [21], [30] III-I
ToRPEDO Attack [31] III-J
AKA Protocol Linkability Attack (LFM) [21], [29], [32] III-K
Legend: = yes, applicable = partially/limited/optional = no, not applicable ? = property unknown
a secure channel between them [33]. However, under certain
special circumstance, e.g., when the UE has no IMSI or no
valid GUTI during emergency attach, the IMEI is sent before
a security context is activated. This is to restrain the misuse
of ME for placing invalid emergency calls [34].
D. GUTI Persistence
Temporary subscriber identifiers like GUTI are used as a
privacy measure to mitigate subscription identification and
tracking by eavesdroppers on the radio link, making it harder
to track the location or activity of a particular subscriber. In
an LTE system, the updating of GUTI is recommended on the
following occasions:
• When the SN gets changed or during a new Attach
procedure;
• During a Tracking Area (TA) update;
• When the SN issues “GUTI reallocation command”.
The major problem with the mechanism of GUTI allocation
in the current LTE system is that it is up to the SN policy
configuration when (if at all) to reallocate the GUTI. It is also
possible for the SN to keep (re)allocating the same old GUTI
to the UE. The UE neither takes part in the generation of the
GUTI nor verifies the freshness of the newly allocated GUTI.
This opens up possibilities for either poor implementations or
poor configuration that keeps the GUTI unchanged for a long
time. The evidence of these poor practices has been found in
real mobile network operators [22], [21] where the operators
tend not to frequently update the GUTI on these occasions.
The reason ascribed to such practices is to avoid the signalling
storms [35] within the networks. In LTE networks, acquiring
or tracking the temporary subscription identifiers has been
one of the most important attack strategies in compromising
subscription privacy [22]. GUTI persistence has been identified
as a Key Issue in 3GPP TR 33.899 (sub-clause 5.7.3.1) [6].
E. Mapping between GUTI and MSISDN
These attacks are somewhat related to the IMSI-probing
ones but are more fine-grained. In these attacks, the attacker
starts with similar assumptions about knowing one of the
subscription long-term identities and the aim is to locate and
then further trace that subscriber. The attack uses the usual
techniques of either initiating phone calls [23] or sending
silent SMSs [24] to the target MSISDN. This results in
triggering of their paging procedures, which ultimately lead to
a mapping between the known identity (usually MSISDN) and
the GUTI [25]. This enables an attacker to track a particular
subscriber for a long duration due to infrequent updation of
GUTI in LTE (details in Section III-D). Note that in these
attacks paging messages are sought by the attackers instead
of looking out for a generic signalling flurry.
F. C-RNTI based Tracking
The Cell Random Network Temporary Identifier (C-RNTI)
is a physical layer 16-bit identifier unique within a given cell
and is assigned to each device during the “Random Access
Procedure” (see Section III-I for details). Passive analysis of
real LTE traffic has revealed that the C-RNTI is included in
the header (in unencrypted form) of every single packet [26].
This leads to linking of the radio traffic (both user and control
plane) by a passive adversary. Further mapping to a user’s
GUTI or MSISDN is trivial and can be undertaken via the
use of silent text messages. Through tracking of the C-RNTI
value, an attacker can easily determine how long a given user
stays at a given location.
Further analysis of captured LTE traffic has revealed that
during mobility handover events these physical layer identifiers
can be linked together. This leads to traceability of users when
they move from cell to cell. This was because the captured
handover triggering messages were sent in the clear. According
to the response of the standardization bodies, these messages
are not suppose to be in the clear.
G. GUTI Reallocation Replay Attack
As explained in Section II-B, subscribers communicate with
the networks using GUTIs as their identifiers for privacy
purposes. To avoid traceability of subscribers based upon
GUTI, it is imperative that these temporary identifiers are
updated frequently. To update the GUTI, the mobile networks
use a process called “GUTI Reallocation Procedure” (sub-
clause 5.4.1 of TS 24.301 [36]). Figure 5 depicts this procedure
as defined for an LTE system in [36]. In this figure, oGUTI
depicts the old GUTI and nGUTI is the new GUTI, while
CK is the “confidentiality key”. The procedure is as follows:
• The UE identifies itself to the network on a dedicated
channel via its currently allocated temporary identifier
oGUTI .
• The network identifies the UE and establishes the means
of ciphering for subsequent communication.
• Thereafter, a new GUTI (nGUTI) is sent to
the UE in a message encrypted with CK via a
GUTI_Reallocation_Command. If required, this
message may also contain the identity of the current
location area (nLAI).
• Upon receipt of the GUTI reallocation command, the
GUTI replies via the GUTI_Reallocation_Complete
message to acknowledge receipt of the new GUTI.
UE
(IMSI , oGUTI , CK)
Network
(IMSI , oGUTI , CK)
new nGUTI
deallocate oGUTI deallocate oGUTI
oGUTI
{GUTI_REALLOC_CMD, nGUTI , nLAI}CK
{GUTI_REALLOC_COMPLETE}CK
Ciphering management; CK established
Fig. 5: GUTI Reallocation Procedure.
If the network does not receive the expected acknowledg-
ment from the UE, it maintains both oGUTI and nGUTI
for the concerned IMSI. The standard defines two methods
for the means of ciphering, i.e., for the establishment of the
confidentiality key CK: (1) either a new key is established via
the authentication procedure; or (2) a previously established
ciphering key is restored via the security mode setup proce-
dure. The option of using the restored keys allows a linkability
attack on the GUTI reallocation procedure [21], [27]. As
the GUTI_Reallocation_Command does not contain a re-
play protection mechanism, an adversary is able to exploit this
weakness. The adversary first captures a GUTI reallocation
command. Later, when the UE has already updated its GUTI
but not yet the ciphering key CK, the attacker replays the cap-
tured reallocation command. The victim UE has no way to de-
tect this replay attack. It successfully decrypts this reallocation
command and replies via a GUTI_Reallocation_Complete
message. This allows the adversary to distinguish the target
UE from any other, as other UEs will not be able to decrypt
the reallocation command and hence will not reply with the
completion message, even though in the meantime the target
UE was assigned with an updated GUTI. This results in the
adversary being able to track the target user with minimal
effort.
H. RRC Protocol Vulnerabilities / Misimplementations
The Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol is used to
set up and manage the radio connectivity between the UE
and SN. The major functions of the RRC protocol include
connection establishment and release functions, broadcast of
system information, radio bearer establishment, reconfigura-
tion and release, RRC connection mobility procedures, paging
notification and release, etc. Within the protocol stack, it exists
at the network (IP) layer. The RRC protocol is specified in
3GPP TS 25.331 [37] for UMTS and in 3GPP TS 36.331 [38]
for LTE. In LTE, when the UE selects a cell in RRC idle
mode, it does not validate whether the base station is authentic
or fake. As a result, the UE may clamp on to a rogue base
station. So far, the mobile telephony systems have focused
on providing secure communication in the RRC connected
state and security aspects in RRC idle state have not been
considered. This vulnerability of UE to false base station
attacks during the RRC idle state has been acknowledged as
a Key Issue in TR 33.899 (sub-clause 5.4.3.1) [6].
The LTE RRC protocol also contains a “network informa-
tion broadcast” function in which GUTIs associated with the
SNs are broadcasted over the air [22]. These broadcasts are
neither encrypted nor authenticated, hence can be decoded
easily by an adversary. Since these broadcasts are location
specific, techniques described in [23] can be exploited to reveal
presence of subscribers in that specific area (a type of IMSI-
probing attack, as explained in Section III-B). Another type
of RRC message which contains subscriber-specific sensitive
information is the “UE measurement report”. In particular, two
types of UE measurement reports have been exploited in the
literature [22] to compromise location of subscribers:
• Measurement Report: Measurement report is a neces-
sary part of the handover procedure of LTE networks.
The SN sends a “measurement configuration” message
to the UE indicating what type of measurement is to be
performed. In response, the UE compiles and sends the
appropriate measurement report. The earlier LTE specifi-
cations (Version 12.5.0 of TS 36.331 and earlier) allowed
transmission of these RRC messages before establishment
of a security context between the UE and SN. This has
been exploited to compromise the location of subscribers
by decoding of the location information contained within
these messages [22], [28]. However, later the specification
was updated to allow measurement report transmission
only after establishment of the security context between
UE and SN. Although the attack descriptions in [22]
mention “mapping between GUTI and IMSI via semi-
passive attacks”, it is unclear whether knowledge of the
victim’s IMSI contributes towards these attacks - hence
the property unknown label (?) in Table II.
• Radio Link Failure (RLF) Reports: RLF reports are
used to troubleshoot signal coverage issues. These reports
contain serving and neighboring base stations’ identifiers
along with their corresponding power measurements,
which can be used as inputs to trilateration techniques
such as [39] to determine an accurate position of the UE.
The LTE standard (Appendix A.6 of [38]) does not allow
transmission of RLF reports before establishment of a
security context between the UE and SN. However, prac-
tical investigations [22] of real-world mobile networks
has found that LTE phones (baseband processor to be
more specific) do transmit these reports without a security
context, leading to location leaks of the subscribers. This
shows that the related guidelines within the standard are
vague and ambiguous (described in an appendix located
at the end of a 900+ page document), which leads to
incorrect implementation by multiple manufacturers.
I. IMSI-based Paging
Figure 6 outlines the paging procedure in LTE. The Mobility
Management Entity (MME) (a part of the SN’s core network)
is responsible for initiating paging and authentication of the
mobile device, while eNodeB is the LTE base station (part of
SN’s access network). At the commencement of the paging,
the MME starts a timer (T3413) and expects a response
from the UE before the expiration of this timer. UEs in
RRC Idle mode use Discontinuous Reception (DRX) also
known as the paging cycle to reduce power consumption.
This DRX cycle determines how frequently the UE checks
for paging messages. The default DRX cycle is broadcast by
the SN via the System Information Block (SIB). The Paging
Occasion (PO) for a UE (i.e., when it wakes up to check
for paging messages) is given by three numbers: the paging
cycle T ∈ {32, 64, 128, 256}; the Paging Frame Index (PFI),
which is an integer between 0 and T − 1; and a subframe
index s where, 0 ≤ s ≤ 9. The UE decodes the RRC paging
messages and if it finds its identifier within this message then it
initiates the acquirement of an available radio channel through
the “Random Access Procedure”. Thereafter, the UE requests
the eNodeB via the “RRC Connection Request” to configure
radio resources for signalling exchange. After completion of
this RRC connection setup, the UE send a “Service Request”
message and enters the connected state.
In LTE paging, two types of identities could be used to alert
idle UEs about incoming data: temporary identifier GUTI or
permanent identifier IMSI. Usually, it is the GUTI which is
utilized as an identifier within the paging messages. However,
in situations where the SN loses its context with the UE due
to a crash or restart, the provision is there to send the IMSI as






















Fig. 6: The LTE paging mechanism.
sending paging messages has been reported as a privacy threat
to users [22], [29], [30], [21].
A passive adversary can just observe the radio commu-
nication in an interested location and come to know which
subscribers are located in that particular area. Since during
the paging procedure a security context is not yet established
between the UE and SN, an active adversary can set up a
false base station in an area of interest (airports, hospitals,
etc.). It can then start sending out IMSI-based paging requests
to the subscribers and, based upon the responses, will come
to know which IMSIs are present in that particular area.
The LTE subscribers reply to IMSI-based paging triggers
via their GUTIs. Hence, this leads to a correlation between
the IMSIs and GUTIs. This, combined with the initiation of
paging mechanism via placing phone calls to the MSISDN
(Section III-E), allows an attacker to further correlate its IMSI
and GUTI with the MSISDN. Thus active/passive listeners,
fake SNs, etc. can track down subscribers with reasonable
accuracy to a specific geographic area, which has serious
privacy implications. IMSI-based paging has been identified
as a Key Issue in 3GPP TR 33.899 (sub-clause 5.7.3.10) [6].
J. ToRPEDO Attack
In LTE paging, the POs are determined by the UE’s IMSI.
This mechanism has been exploited to verify the presence (or
absence) of a target in a specific location via an attack called
ToRPEDO (TRacking via Paging mEssage DistributiOn) [31].
This attack leverages the fact that the PO for a specific
UE is always fixed as it is based upon its IMSI. Hence,
through triggering successive paging procedures, the attacker
is ultimately able to determine the presence or absence of a
target UE with high confidence.
Moreover, in the ToRPEDO process, the attacker learns the
last 7 bits of the UE’s IMSI. We now briefly outline this
leakage process. In LTE, the last 10 bits of the subcriber’s
IMSI are used for calculating the PO of a device. In this
calculation, however, the IMSI is considered to be a 14/15-
digit decimal number instead of a TBCD encoded number.
Without loss of generality, if we consider T = 128, then
successfully calculating the victim’s PO will leak the last 7
bits of the victim’s IMSI.
K. Linkability of AKA Failure Messages
All generations of mobile telephony suffer from a location
attack known as the Linkability of (AKA) Failure Messages
(LFM) attack [32], [29], [21]. The LFM attack exploits the
fact that in an AKA protocol (see Section II-E), in the event
of an erroneous authentication challenge, the reason for the
authentication failure is exposed to the attacker, i.e., either
MAC_Failure or Sync_Failure . This allows an attacker to
link two different AKA sessions to identify a target user. The
LFM attack is simple to execute in practice. The attacker first
observes an AKA session of the target user and records the
authentication challenge (R,AUTN ). Later, when the attacker
wants to check whether another AKA session belongs to
the same user or not, he replays the recorded authentication
challenge and observes the type of failure message received.
In the case of MAC_Failure it is some other user, while in
the case of Sync_Failure it is the same user. Note that in
an LFM attack no further computations are required and the
results are precise. Hence this is a devastating attack (albeit
under additional assumptions about the attacker’s capabilities)
which compromises subscription location and, as an extension,
allows user-traceability.
IV. THE PRESENT - PRIVACY IMPROVEMENTS BY 3GPP
RELEASE 15
Release 15 comes with several new security features that
significantly improve subscription privacy on the radio inter-
face [40], [41]. Table III provides a summary of the effect
of these new features upon the vulnerabilities from previous
generations.
A. Concealment of SUPI
Keeping in view the severity of the threats posed by SUPI
exposure via IMSI-catching attacks (Section III-A), 3GPP
decided to address this problem in 5G Release 15 (sub-
clause 5.2.5 of TS 33.501) [3]. In the event of identification
failure via a 5G-GUTI, unlike earlier generations, 5G security
specifications do not allow plaintext transmissions of the
SUPI over the radio interface. Instead, a public-key based
privacy-preserving identifier containing the concealed SUPI is
transmitted. The public-key scheme chosen by 3GPP for this
purpose is the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme
(ECIES) [45]. The concealed identifier is called the SUCI.
The UE generates the SUCI with the public key pk of the HN
using an ECIES-based protection scheme. We now provide an
overview of the ECIES-based protection scheme as described
in TS 33.501 (Annex C.3) [3].
ECIES is a hybrid encryption scheme that combines Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) [46] with symmetric cryptogra-
phy; it is a semantically secure probabilistic encryption scheme
ensuring that successive encryptions of the same plaintext
with the same public key result in different ciphertexts with
very high probability. The use of ECIES for concealment of
the SUPI adheres to the Standards for Efficient Cryptography
Group (SECG) specifications [47], [48]. To compute a fresh
SUCI, the UE generates a fresh ECC ephemeral public/private
key pair utilizing the HN public key pk. This public key is
securely provisioned to the UE during the USIM registration.
Processing on the UE side is undertaken according to the
encryption operation illustrated in Figure 7a. The final output
of this protection scheme is the concatenation of the ECC
ephemeral public key, the ciphertext value, the MAC tag
value, and any other parameters, if applicable. The HN uses
the received ECC ephemeral public key and its private key
(corresponding to public key pk) to deconceal the received
SUCI. Processing on the HN side is illustrated in Figure 7b.
TS 33.501 includes two ECIES profiles, both for approx-
imately 128-bit security level. Both profiles use AES-128
in CTR mode for confidentiality and HMAC-SHA-256 for
authenticity in the symmetric cryptography part, and use either
Curve25519 or secp256r1 elliptic curves for the public-key
cryptography part.
Only the MSIN part of the SUPI is concealed by this protec-
tion scheme, while the home network identifier (MCC/MNC)
is transmitted in plaintext as it is required for routing in
roaming use cases. The data fields constituting the SUCI are:
• Protection Scheme Identifier: This field represents the
specified protection scheme.
• Home Network Public Key Identifier: This represents
the public key pk provisioned by the HN.
• Home Network Identifier: This contains the MCC and
MNC part of the SUPI.
• Protection Scheme Output: This represents the output
of the public-key based protection scheme.
As the pk comes pre-configured on the USIM, a public-key
infrastructure is not needed. Also, the subscription identifica-
tion is achieved in just one pass of communication, which
helps in reducing the connection set-up time. Further, this
scheme is oblivious to desynchronization [49] of identifiers
between the UE and HN and requires simple key management,
both of which lead to significant reduction in connection
failures. However, there still remain aspects which require
further improvement. We discuss these issues in further detail
in Section V-D.
B. Strict Refreshment of GUTI
In 5G Release 15 (sub-clause 6.12.3 of TS 33.501), it is
mandatory to refresh the 5G-GUTI on the following occasions:
• Initial Registration: If the SN receives a Registration
Request message of type "initial registration" or "mobility
registration update" from a UE, it should send a new 5G-
GUTI to the UE in the registration procedure.
• Mobility Registration Update: If the SN receives a Reg-
istration Request message of type "mobility registration
update" from a UE, it should send a new 5G-GUTI to
the UE in the registration procedure.
xTABLE III: Effect of 5G privacy enhancements upon existing attacks























































































SUPI Concealment Sub-clause 5.2.5 of TS 33.501 [3] IV-A
Strict GUTI Refreshment Sub-clause 6.12.3 of TS 33.501 [3] IV-B
False Base Station Detection Framework Annex E of TS 33.501 [3] IV-C
De-coupling of SUPI from Paging Sub-clause 9.3.3.18 of TS 38.413 [42] IV-D
GUTI-based Paging Occasion Sub-clause 7.1 of TS 38.304 [43] IV-E
Secure Radio Redirections TS 38.331 [44] IV-F
Legend: = resolves, applicable = partial/limited effect = does not resolve, not applicable
• Periodic Registration Update: If the SN receives a Reg-
istration Request message of type "periodic registration
update" from a UE, it should send a new 5G-GUTI to
the UE in the registration procedure.
• Network Triggered Service Request: Upon receiving a
Service Request message sent by the UE in response to
a paging message, the SN sends a new 5G-GUTI to the
UE.
These mandatory update features makes identifying or tracing
subscribers, based on 5G-GUTI, impractical. Further, it is left
to network operator’s implementation to re-assign 5G-GUTI
more frequently, for example after a Service Request message
from the UE not triggered by the network.
C. False Base Station Detection Framework
As evident from the description of vulnerabilities in Sec-
tion III, most attacks on previous generations leverage false
base stations before the UE can go into an authenticated
state. To counter such vulnerabilities, a general framework for
detecting false base stations has been described in 5G Release
15 (Annex E of [3]). This network-based detection framework
uses radio condition information (measurement reports of
Section III-H)) received from the devices which could be used
to make it significantly harder for false base stations to remain
stealthy. The received-signal strength and location information
in measurement reports can be used to detect a false base
station which tries to attract the UEs by transmitting signal
with higher power than that of the genuine base stations. These
reports can also be used to detect a false base station which
replays the original network broadcast information without
any modification. To detect a false base station which replays
modified broadcast information to prevent victim UEs from
switching back and forth between itself and the genuine base
stations (e.g., by modifying neighboring cells, cell reselection
criteria, registration timers, etc. to avoid the so called ping-
pong effect), information on broadcast information can be
used to detect inconsistency from the deployment informa-
tion. Further, false base stations using unusual frequencies or
cell identifiers can be detected by analyzing the respective
information in the received measurements reports. Networks
and devices can utilise other additional security and privacy
features which are proprietary to the operators. Effective false
base station detection should result in significant privacy im-
provement. This is because it has already been proven by [50]
that in case of uncorrupted mobile network participants, the
AKA protocol provides anonymity guarantees to the UE.
D. Decoupling of SUPI from the Paging Mechanism
The provision of paging UE based on SUPI has been
removed from 5G (sub-clause 9.3.3.18 of TS 38.413) [42].
Moreover, the calculation of the paging frame index and
paging occasions is no longer based on SUPI and is instead
based on 5G-GUTI. Coupled with the mandatory 5G-GUTI
update mechanism (Section IV-B), this makes it impractical
for false base stations to use paging messages to identify or
trace subscribers.
E. GUTI-based Paging Occasions
While in LTE, POs were determined based on the device’s
IMSI; now in 5G they are based on a temporary identifier
(called a 5G-S-TMSI) which is a subset of the device’s GUTI.
The result of this change is that now the ToRPEDO attack
(Section III-J) which leveraged fixed POs for a target UE is
not able to exploit the permanency in paging timings anymore.
This enhancement along with frequent GUTI refreshment
(Section IV-B) results in enhanced user privacy.
F. Secure Radio Redirections
It is mandatory in 5G Release 15 (TS 38.331 [44]) to
integrity protect RRC messages that redirect devices. This
feature mitigates false-base-station-based rogue redirections.
(a) Encryption at the UE side
(b) Decryption at the HN side
Fig. 7: Detail of ECIES-based Protection Scheme as defined in 3GPP TS 33.501 [3].
As a result, the level of difficulty of launching various privacy
attacks which rely on rogue redirections increases manifold.
V. THE FUTURE - OUTSTANDING ISSUES, NEW ATTACKS
& PROPOSED MEASURES
The successful deployment of future 5G systems requires
resolution of the outstanding subscription privacy issues. In
this section, we highlight the subscription privacy vulnera-
bilities which were not addressed by Release 15. We also
discuss recent literature which either suggests improvements
or presents new attacks on 5G subscription privacy.
A. Unresolved Vulnerabilities
An examination of Table III reveals that there are three
privacy issues from previous generations which were not
aptly addressed by Release 15: (Raw) IMSI-probing (Sec-
tion III-B), C-RNTI-based tracking (Section III-F) and the
AKA-protocol-based LFM attack (Section III-K). Regarding
(Raw) IMSI-probing, as already discussed in Section III-B,
it is highly unlikely that 3GPP will adopt countermeasures
to this particular problem because of the high overhead of
the necessary dummy signalling. The only feasible solution
to handle the C-RNTI-based privacy breaches is to employ
a network-wide PKI [51] since this requires encryption of
these pre-authentication identifiers. This is unlikely to be a
desirable option for 3GPP due to the high costs associated
with deploying and maintaining a PKI.
Arapinis et al. [29], while highlighting the LFM vulnerabil-
ity, also proposed a fix to resolve this problem. The proposed
fix requires the HNs to have a public/private key pair where
each USIM stores the public key of its HN. The AKA failure
messages are then encrypted using the network’s public key.
They verified the privacy properties of their fixes using the
automated symbolic analysis tool ProVerif [52]. However,
their proposed fix has been shown by Fouque et al. [53] to
be still suffer from certain privacy weaknesses. Fouque et
al. presented their own improved variant of the public-key-
based fix for the LFM vulnerability. 3GPP never considered
adoption of these proposals, most probably because they are
public-key-based and introduce significant overheads. As the
UE and HN already share common secrets between them, a
more viable way forward is to resolve this issue through the
use of symmetric-key techniques. We explore such approaches
further in Section V-C.
B. New Attacks on 5G Subscription Privacy
Borgaonkar et al. [54] presented new attacks against all
variants of the AKA protocol, including 5G AKA, which
breach subscribers’ privacy. These attacks exploit a logical
vulnerability in the AKA protocol’s failure mechanism. This
vulnerability stems from the use of XOR within the re-sync
token AUTS (see Figure 4), which is a concatenation of two
parameters; CONC∗ and MAC∗. The parameter CONC∗
contains the current sequence number of the UE in a masked
form as SQNUE ⊕ AK∗, where AK∗ = f5∗(K,R). Note
that during calculation of the masking key AK∗, the value
R is extracted from the received authentication challenge (R,
AUTN ). Hence, in case of receiving the same authentication
challenge twice at two different times t1 and t2, the masked








where AK∗1 = f5
∗(K,R), AK∗2 = f5
∗(K,R), SQN1UE is
the sequence number of UE at time t1 and SQN2UE is the
sequence number at time t2. Therefore, the adversary can
compute:
CONC∗1 ⊕ CONC∗2 = SQN1UE ⊕ SQN2UE .
Based upon this logical vulnerability, [54] presented two new
attacks against 5G subscription privacy: Activity Monitoring
Attack (AMA) and Location Confidentiality Attack (LCA).
In AMA, the aim of the adversary is to learn the n least
significant bits of SQNUE at two different time instances, t1
and t2. Thereafter, from the difference between the sequence
numbers (corresponding to successful authentication sessions),
the attacker infers the volume of “activity” (number of calls,
SMSs, etc.) a particular user has performed between these two
time instances, hence the name Activity Monitoring Attack.
To mount AMA, the adversary requires malicious interaction
with both UE and HN (via SN). Hence, the compromise
of both identity confidentiality and location confidentiality of
the target UE are prerequisites to launch an AMA. Details
of a single instance of the attack at a particular time t are
now explained. The online phase of the AMA is depicted in
Figure 8. During this phase the attacker first fetches 2n−1+1
successive authentication challenges from the HN for the
targeted UE. The attacker then sends a particular n+1 of these
challenges to the UE, each followed by a replay instance of the
initially received authentication challenge (R0, AUTN0), and
records the corresponding n+1 resync tokens, i.e. AUTS‘ and
AUTSj (for j = 0 to n−1). In the offline phase, utilizing the
logical vulnerability elaborated earlier, the attacker retrieves
the following values from the recorded resync tokens:
δi = SQN
0
HN ⊕ (SQN0HN + 2i)for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
where SQN0HN is the initial value of the HN’s sequence
number at the start of the attack. Note that due to receipt
of the first authentication challenge (R0, AUTN0) from the
adversary, the UE will also sync its sequence number to this
value at the start of the attack. Further, by feeding these n
values into the SQN inference algorithm (see Figure 9), the
attacker extracts the n least significant bits of SQN0HN .
In LCA the aim of the attacker is to find out whether some
targeted UE is present at a certain location or not. The LCA
proceeds as follows:
1) The attacker observes a 5G-AKA session of some tar-
geted user2 UEx and extracts the corresponding CONC∗x
value by replaying the observed authentication challenge
to UEx.
2) After some time, if the attacker wishes to check whether
another unknown 5G-AKA session belongs to UEx or
not, the attacker again replays the earlier observed chal-
lenge from the step above to this unknown user and
obtains CONC∗? .
3) Now based upon the value CONC∗x ⊕ CONC∗? , the at-
tacker can infer (with non-negligible probability) whether
this new user is UEx or not. In the case of some other
user, this will be a random value, while in the case of
UEx, the attacker will equate SQNoldUEx ⊕ SQN currentUEx
due to canceling out of the common masking key AK∗.
This value (dependent upon the lapsed time) should be
small in the case of user UEx.
Khan and Martin [55] have analyzed these attacks for their
effectiveness, practicability and potency against 5G. Their
analysis reveals that the AMA is not as effective against 5G
as it is against the previous generations (3G/4G). The analysis
2Note that it is not necessary for the attacker to know the SUPI of the
user to launch this attack.
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for i = 0 to 2n−1 :
for j = 0 to n− 1 :
Fig. 8: The online phase of the AMA.
Data: δi for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
Result: X = n least significant bits of SQN0HN
X ← [0, 0, . . . , 0] // init an array of size n
for i← 0 to n− 1 do
// Analyze δi at bit positions i, i+ 1
(b1, b2)← (δi [i] , δi [i+ 1])
if (b1, b2)⇔ (1, 0) then




else if (b1, b2)⇔ (1, 1) then










Fig. 9: SQN Inference Algorithm.
also brings to light the fact that the LCA is a direct extension of
the existing privacy vulnerability of LFM (Section III-K). They
also established that any effective countermeasure (details in
Section V-C) introduced to fix the LFM attack will also render
these two new attacks ineffective.
C. Fixing LFM, AMA and LCA
As discussed previously in Section V-A and Section V-B, a
symmetric-key-based solution is required which should resolve
the three vulnerabilities of LFM, AMA and LCA. We now
briefly review some solutions proposed by [54].
1) Symmetrically Encrypting SQNUE (Fix 1): This fix
consists of modifying the sequence-number-concealing mech-
anism. Instead of using XOR to conceal SQNUE , this fix
utilizes symmetric encryption. The resulting fix is depicted in
Figure 10a. To counter the LFM attack, it suffices to hide the
reason for the 5G-AKA protocol failure inside the ciphertext
CONC∗. The authors of [54] claim that this fix is easy
to deploy in the current cellular system as it only requires
changes in the baseband module of the UE (i.e. ME) and
not USIM. This seems strange as it is the USIM (not the
mobile handset) which is directly under the control of the
mobile network operator. This solution suffers from a flaw:
when an attacker triggers a failure message by injecting the
same authentication challenge twice while the SQNUE has
not being updated in the UE, then the replied CONC∗ will
be the same as before, leaking to the attacker that SQNUE is
unchanged.
2) Correctly Randomizing AUTS (Fix 2): Another way to
fix the AMA and LCA is to generate a new random value
(R∗) to conceal SQNUE instead of utilizing the one (R)
received in the authentication challenge. This R∗ needs to
be sent back in the clear to the HN along with AUTS for
decryption of SQNUE . Figure 10b depicts this solution. Note
that the original R must be used in the calculation of MAC∗
to guarantee a fresh response to the received authentication
challenge. Otherwise, an attacker will be able to replay an old
response back to the HN, forcing it to synchronize its SQNHN
to an older value. Also note that this fix does not resolve the
LFM attack on its own.
3) Combining Fix 1 and Fix 2 (Fix 3): Both Fix 1 and
Fix 2 have limitations of their own. Fix 1 suffers from a
minor flaw, while Fix 2 is not suitable for LFM attack. For a
comprehensive solution, which resolves both of these issues,
we combine Fix 1 and Fix 2 as suggested in [54]. This
combined fix is depicted in Figure 10c and addresses LFM,
AMA and LCA without any known flaws / limitations.
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If ¬(i) or ¬(ii) then:
(a) Fix 1: Symmetrically encrypting SQNUE .
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CONC∗ ← SQNUE ⊕AK∗
AUTS ← CONC∗‖MAC∗‖R∗ Sync_Failure, AUTS
If (i) and ¬(ii) then:
(b) Fix 2: Correctly randomizing AUTS.
UE







AUTS ← CONC∗‖MAC∗‖R∗ Failure, AUTS
If ¬(i) or ¬(ii) then:
(c) Fix 3: Combining Fix_1 and Fix_2.
Fig. 10: Proposed Fixes for 5G-AKA failure messages.
D. Shortcomings of the Current 3GPP SUPI Protection Mech-
anism
The issues with the current ECIES-based SUPI protec-
tion mechanism (IV-A) were communicated to 3GPP by the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute’s (ETSI)
Security Algorithms Group of Experts (SAGE) [56] and are
detailed as follows:
• Post-Quantum Vulnerability: As the ECIES-based
scheme employs ECC to provision identity privacy, it
relies on the hardness assumption of the Elliptic Curve
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). A quantum ad-
versary capable of issuing quantum queries to an appro-
priate quantum computer can easily break this scheme by
employing Shor’s quantum algorithm [57].
• Chosen SUPI Attacks: Any arbitrary third party is able
to select a SUPI of its choosing and send the correspond-
ing SUCI to the HN. Thereafter the adversary can look
out for various responses from the HN, depending on
whether the target user is present in that particular cell
area or not. Any noticeable variation in the perceived
output would allow the adversary to confirm or deny the
presence of the target in that particular cell. There is no
mechanism in the ECIES-based scheme to prevent these
kinds of attack.
• Replay Attacks: The ECIES-based scheme does not have
any inherent mechanism to provide freshness guarantees
to the HN and is thus susceptible to replay attacks. An
adversary can always resend a previously encrypted SUPI
to the HN and look out for various responses (such as
authentication challenge or a failure message). Based on
the received response, a device whose SUPI is unknown
to the attacker may be tracked with some confidence [58].
• Downgrade Attacks: An active adversary simulating a
(false) base station can force the UE to fall back to one
of the previous generations (GSM/UMTS/LTE) and can
then get hold of the IMSI/SUPI using an identity request
message. In 3GPP Release 15 [9], the SUPI is derived
directly from the IMSI, so these downgrade attacks also
compromise the 5G SUPI.
• Update of HN Public Key: There could be situations
which require the HN to have a robust way of quickly
updating its public key to the subscriber UEs. One
such scenario could be a malware attack which tries to
recover the home network’s private key. Such situations
enforce the need to have a quick way of updating the
corresponding public keys.
E. Quantum-secure and Downgrade-resistant SUPI Protection
As pointed out in Section V-D and by [59], the current
ECIES-based SUPI protection solution is vulnerable to quan-
tum cryptanalysis. Until the publication of the 3GPP public-
key-based protection mechanism, the technical problem of
finding a SUPI protection solution remained open in a purely
symmetric-key setting. However, in 2018 Khan et al. [60]
addressed all the shortcomings of the ECIES-based mechanism
pointed out in Section V-D, except for the downgrade attacks.
Interestingly, another paper [61] (at the same event) proposed a
protection mechanism for the downgrade attacks against 5G. It
seems viable that these two solutions can be combined together
to come up with a 5G-SUPI protection mechanism that is both
quantum-secure and downgrade-resistant.
F. IBE-based SUPI Protection
Both the current 3GPP SUPI protection mechanism (Sec-
tion IV-A) and the alternative symmetric key proposal by [60]
hide only the MSIN part of the SUPI, while the MCC and
MNC parts are sent in the clear over-the-air to the SN for rout-
ing of the SUCI to the correct HN. Also, to increase look-up
efficiency, mobile network operators divide their subscribers’
database into further sub-domains [62]. Therefore, it is re-
quired that the SUCI be delivered to the correct sub-domain
within the HN. Typically, this requires between 1 and 3 digits
after the MCC/MNC in the MSIN to be sent in the clear as part
of the routing information [63]. All this results in a weakening
of the privacy protection being offered to the mobile subscriber
as a significant part of its identity is now exposed to an
attacker. Another limitation of the 3GPP protection mechanism
and proposal of [60] is that the SN is entirely dependent
upon the HN for revealing the SUCI and the associated LI
purposes [64]. Several countermeasures have been proposed
in 3GPP meetings for handling of this issue [65], [66], [67],
[68], [69]. All of these suggested countermeasures introduce
overhead either due to additional signalling messages or due to
requirements for new parameters. Moreover, there is nothing
stopping the UE and its HN from colluding to provide the SN
with a false SUPI.
To counter the mentioned limitations, Khan and Niemi [70]
proposed a 5G-SUPI protection scheme based on Identity-
based Encryption (IBE). In this scheme, the UE’s HN acts
as the Private Key Generator (PKG). IBE-based schemes in-
herently resolve the exposure of the partial MSIN and provide
better Lawful Interception guarantees as the SN can now work
out the SUPI from the SUCI independently of the HN. The
proposal by [70] can be argued to be a better alternative to
the current 3GPP mechanism, although the associated key-
revocation is quite complex. However, compared with [60],
it is not quantum secure and the increase in computational
and signalling overhead is much higher. Also, it is unclear
whether the IBE-based solution can be used in combination
with the downgrade protection proposal of [61]. Given these
limitations, in the long-term, the solution of [60] might be
preferable.
G. Study on Protection against False Base Stations
Another important avenue which still requires further re-
search is that of protection against false-base-station at-
tacks. Although 5G Release 15 provides a false-base-station-
detection framework (Section IV-C), its status is informative
only. Moreover, the provided framework is generic in nature
and focuses only on the detection aspects. Very recently, 3GPP
has initiated a comprehensive study [81] which focuses on
security enhancements against false base stations for the next
5G Release 16. The aim is to study the potential threats and
privacy issues associated with false-base-station scenarios and
identify potential solutions for mitigating the risks caused by
false base stations. As various attacks against 5G subscription
privacy on the radio interface exploit false base stations as the
underlying platform, this study will also contribute towards
subscription privacy enhancement in Release 16.
VI. RELATED WORK
We believe there does not exist any prior work in the
published literature with exclusive focus on 5G subscription
privacy. The probable reason for this seems to be that 5G is a
very nascent technology within which extensive development
and upgrades were undertaken as late as June 2019. Table IV
presents a summary of the related literature which has con-
sidered security and privacy in 5G or 5G-like networks. Here,
we briefly discuss the work carried out in these publications.
Rupprecht et al. [71] categorized and systematized attacks in
existing mobile generations (GSM/UMTS/LTE) by their aim,
impact and attacker capabilities. They further identified future
research directions for 5G networks based on these existing
security and privacy issues. The main difference between [71]
and our work is that we also consider 5G Release 15, while
the privacy analysis of [71] is limited only to the previous
generations. Tourani et al. [72] have analyzed security, privacy
and access control within the scope of Information-centric
Networking (ICN). ICN is a networking paradigm which
focuses on content of the traffic rather than its origin - a
concept similar [82] to network slicing (Appendix B) in 5G.
Ahmad et al. [73], [74] analyzed generic security and privacy
threats to 5G networks and suggested possible solutions to
these threats from the published literature. As both of these
works were carried out before the publication of the 5G
standard, they are mostly speculative in nature. Khan et al. [75]
have presented a survey about security and privacy of 5G. The
5G privacy issues discussed in [75] are again speculative in
nature as the manuscript was drafted before the publication of
5G Release 15.
Jover [76] discussed security challenges faced by 5G. The
main focus of this work was the integration of a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) within the current 5G network architecture
to resolve outstanding security and privacy issues. Ferrag et
al. [77] presented a survey of existing authentication and
privacy-preserving schemes for LTE and 5G mobile networks.
They provided a classification of threat models in 4G and 5G
cellular networks in four categories: attacks against privacy, at-
tacks against integrity, attacks against availability, and attacks
against authentication. They also provided a classification of
the respective countermeasures into three categories: cryp-
tographic methods, humans factors, and intrusion detection
methods. It seems that the work of [77] presumed that all
the analysis and contextualization with respect to 4G can be
seamlessly applied to 5G. The reason for this is because at the
time of publication of [77] (January, 2018) even the Stage-23
of 5G Release 15 was not completed (see Figure 1).
Gandotra and Jha [78] presented a survey on various energy-
efficient scenarios for green communication in 5G and the
related security aspects. For improving the battery lifetime of
user terminals, [78] proposed transmitting information through
relays and discussed security susceptibilities via these relays
and the associated countermeasures. However, [78] did not
consider 5G privacy. Rangisetti and Tamma [79] explored the
aspects related to migration of mobile network infrastructure
in LTE and 5G to Software Defined Networking (SDN) and
Network Function Virtualization (NFV). It further elaborated
security issues in migration to these new technologies and
3“Stage-2” is a stage where logical analysis, devising an abstract architec-
ture of functional elements and the information flows amongst them across
reference points between functional entities is carried out.
TABLE IV: Important recent survey publications related to 5G security and privacy
Reference Publication Year Application Area Main Contribution Relevance to 5G Subscription Privacy
[71] 2018 2G, 3G, 4G A survey of existing literature on attacks in
previous generations (GSM/UMTS/LTE) of
mobile telephony.
Suggests research directions / improvements
for 5G subscription privacy.
[72] 2018 ICN A survey about security, privacy, and access
control in information-centric networking.
The privacy attack scenarios discussed are
also applicable to 5G networking concepts.
[73], [74] 2017/2018 5G An overview of 5G security challenges and
solutions.
Discusses the privacy challenges in 5G from
the user’s perspective.
[75] 2019 5G A survey on the security and privacy of 5G. Focused on portraying a landscape of futuris-
tic security threats to 5G.
[76] 2019 5G A survey of remaining security and privacy
issues in 5G.
Proposes PKI integration to resolve outstand-
ing issues.
[77] 2018 4G, 5G A survey of existing authentication and
privacy-preserving schemes for 4G and 5G
cellular networks.
Discusses privacy attacks on 5G networks
and provides recommendations for further re-
search.
[78] 2017 5G A survey on green communication and the
associated security challenges in 5G net-
works.
Reviews privacy aspects of various 5G en-
abling technologies like machine-to-machine
(M2M) communications, etc.
[79] 2017 SDN A survey of issues and challenges in design-
ing SDN based 5G networks.
No explicit focus on 5G privacy rather pro-
vides SDN based security solutions for 4G
and 5G networks.
[80] 2019 5G A survey on the security of alternative com-
puting paradigms for 5G networks.
Emphasizes the applicability of alternative
computing paradigms for enhancement of
subscriber privacy.
suggested SDN-based solutions. The work by [79] is focused
on the security issues during architecture migration and not
on subscription privacy. Choudhry and Sharma [80] surveyed
recent computing paradigms as alternative mechanisms for the
enhancement of 5G security. This work particularly focuses
on the feasibility of catalytic and osmotic computing in 5G
networks and not subscription privacy.
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Along with the pursuit of a connected future, at least an
equivalent – if not greater – focus is required on the security
and privacy of these connections. 5G is a platform which will
transform everything from education to AI to medicine. But
5G also comes with potentially enormous privacy risks. Due to
increasing diversity of devices and emergence of new services,
it is necessary for a successful 5G future that these privacy
risks be resolved sooner rather than later. As a result of the
study undertaken in this paper, several privacy vulnerabilities
that remain unresolved in 5G Release 15 are highlighted.
This study concludes that new and more rigorous privacy
protection mechanisms are required to guarantee robust sub-
scription privacy in 5G. As the next evolutionary step in
wireless communication is being taken, 3GPP has the perfect
opportunity to embrace a holistic approach to subscribers’
privacy. In particular, based upon this study, we suggest that
the following avenues should be further explored:
• As 3GPP strive towards a quantum-proof future by sup-
porting 256-bit algorithms [83], it is of utmost importance
that the current subscriber identification protection mech-
anism (being the only public-key-based mechanism in
5G) be replaced with an alternative symmetric proposal,
such as that of [60].
• Additionally, it would be desirable that any such proposal
be strengthened further against downgrade attacks, such
as by integrating the solution of [61].
• For resolution of the AKA protocol linkability and other
new privacy attacks on 5G, the fix depicted in Figure 10c
could be adopted for 5G-AKA’s failure messages.
• Although the attack margin within the GUTI Reallocation
Replay attack (Section III-G) is already a very narrow
one with other new 5G privacy protection measures (such
as the false-base-station-detection framework) reducing
its efficacy further, it remains desirable to patch it com-
pletely.
• Based upon past experience of non-adoption of
informative-only parts of published standards, the false-
base-station-detection framework of 5G Release 15
should be transformed into a normative one.
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APPENDIX A
3GPP “KEY ISSUES”
Key Issue is the terminology used in 3GPP studies for a
potential security or privacy problem related to the topic.
It usually contains a description of the problem, associated
threats, and corresponding requirements to mitigate the threats.
Key Issues by themselves do not mean that problems are
substantial, neither do they mean that the threats are feasible.
Similarly, the requirements proposed for each Key Issue do
not imply that they apply to any technical specification. What
Key Issues provide is an opportunity for interested 3GPP
members to investigate and further explore a particular security
or privacy aspect.
APPENDIX B
NETWORK SLICING IN 5G
Network slicing is a form of virtual network architecture us-
ing the same principles behind Software Defined Networking
(SDN) and Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) in fixed
networks. SDN and NFV deliver greater network flexibility by
allowing traditional network architectures to be partitioned into
virtual elements that can be linked through software. Network
slicing allows multiple virtual networks to be created on top of
a common shared physical infrastructure. The virtual networks
are then customized to meet the specific needs of applications,
services, devices, customers or operators.
In the case of 5G, a single physical network is sliced into
multiple virtual networks that can support different Radio
Access Networks (RANs), or different service types running
across a single RAN. Network slicing plays a critical role
in 5G networks because of the multitude of use cases and
new services that 5G supports. These new use cases and
services place different requirements on the network in terms
of functionality, and their performance requirements vary
enormously. Network slicing maximises the flexibility of 5G
networks, optimizing both the utilization of the infrastructure
and the allocation of resources, which enables greater energy
and cost efficiencies compared to earlier mobile networks.
